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Immigration and identity: An open letter to Labour
The centre-left has been outflanked on issues of immigration and  identity. Labour must
connect with the ‘culturally threatened’, writes Matthew Goodwin or risk undermining the
public’s trust in the political system even more.
Dear Labour,
You know the story well. Beginning in the late 1990s, and then f uelled by accessions to
the EU, a new and unprecedented wave of  migration encountered a hostile public
reaction. Public concern about the issue reached historic levels. At one point, voters
were more concerned about immigration than public services. And while these views were seldom
grounded in objective reality, most voters reached the same conclusion: their government (i.e. you)
should reduce immigration. Between 1995 and 2010, the proportion f avouring reductions jumped f rom 63
to 78 per cent.
You of ten responded by attempting to f rame immigration as an opportunity, rather than a problem. But
voters were never won over. Even today, af ter years of  historic migration and persistent attempts to
appease public anxieties, cit izens of  the UK are more likely than their counterparts on the continent and
in the U.S. to consider immigration problematic: while 25 per cent see an opportunity, 68 per cent see a
problem. It is also worth noting that this latter f igure has jumped seven points since 2008. Your
strategists will know that this is nothing new: the electorate was never sold on immigration. If  this were
the late 1960s we would still be talking about a reservoir of  public hostility. But at the same time, these
parallels are also misleading as other more recent trends have made the story more complicated, and
your challenge multif aceted.
Since 2001 concerns over immigration have been joined by a cluster of  anxieties over security-related
issues – such as crime and terrorism – and more specif ic discomf ort over settled Muslims. The growing
signif icance of  the latter is ref lected in research which shows that the f ar right now polls strongest not
simply in ethnically diverse areas, but where there are large Muslim communities of  Bangladeshi or
Pakistani heritage (while this support is lower in areas with large numbers of  Black Brit ish cit izens). The
challenge of  anti-Muslim prejudice – that is of ten rooted in arguments about def ending the rights of
women, homosexuals and Jews – lies well beyond the ‘immigration debate’ and requires a broader and
more dif f icult conversation with voters. I set out the main thrust of  this conversation below, but at the
moment no polit ical party is really talking about this issue.
At the same time, the continued growth of  established minorit ies and continued EU-based migration will
ensure that promises to curb net migration will continually f ail to satisf y a public appetite f or more
tangible measures. The simple reality is that demographic trends are now beginning to overtake what can
realistically be achieved through the levers of  policy. This means that all polit ical parties will increasingly
struggle to exhibit competence on immigration and identity issues. And nor is this lost on voters. When
asked about steps taken by the government to manage immigration, 74 per cent say the government is
doing a poor or very poor job (a f our point increase since 2010). But this will be especially dif f icult f or
you, Labour. In short, you were never the pref erred party on these issues. And when you were in power
you simply f ailed to convince voters that you were enacting sensible policies on immigration. More
f undamentally, you f ailed to convince voters that you were simply being open and honest with them
about one of  the most prof ound changes taking place in the country.
Underneath the shif t ing tides of  public opinion there also lie deeper and longer-term currents. Your
bonds to voters have weakened considerably. The class-based loyalt ies on which you once relied are
now less important to cit izens. Elections are shaped more strongly by concerns over specif ic issues than
ideological or party af f iliation. And, increasingly, perceptions of  party competence on the key issues and
the images of  leaders are paramount. Like your centre- lef t counterparts on the continent, these deeper
f orces have cult ivated a perf ect storm f or new and more innovative populist challengers. On immigration
and identity the centre- lef t has been outf lanked. The f act that the f ar right is delivering a more resonant
narrative is ref lected in the way in which – across Europe – these parties have made their most striking
inroads into the tradit ional core base of  the centre- lef t: blue-collar skilled workers.
Charting a Way Forward
Unless you acknowledge the nature of  the challenge then any attempt to make progress in immigration
and identity polit ics will be f lawed f rom the outset. The most important task you f ace is to connect with
the “culturally threatened”. You have long argued that – ult imately – anxieties about immigration and
identity can be resolved by tackling economic grievances. This was most recently ref lected in your
leader ’s speech on immigration, which was primarily one about its economic impact. A speech about jobs,
wages, resources, companies, and economic incentives.
This economic narrative has been reinvigorated by the f inancial crises, with many tracing a xenophobic
backlash in Europe to recession and austerity. The f act that the f ar right was rallying immigration and
identity concerns during periods of  economic stability and growth is conveniently ignored. Instead you
assume that these concerns can be resolved by f ocusing on economic grievances, whereby you speak
to the individual (rather than collective) and the f inancial (rather than cultural) anxieties of  voters.
Economic f orces are important. No one is saying they are not. In the electoral battleground this is
ref lected in the f act that – at the 2010 general election – the f ar right polled strongest in seats that had
experienced the largest increases in unemployment since 2005. Large numbers of  voters also continue to
view immigrants as economically threatening: they are a burden on social services, say 63 per cent; they
take jobs away f rom natives, say 58 per cent; and they bring down the wages of  native cit izens, say 52
per cent. But the key point is this: f eelings of  economic threat are not at the crux of  what is going on.
And nor is this opinion.
Decades of  research in the social sciences deliver a clear message: it is a perceived sense of  threat to
the cultural unity of  the nation – rather than economic threat – that is the strongest driver of  prejudice,
and also the desire f or more restrictive immigration and asylum policies. To quote just one conclusion of
many: ‘Britons are clearly worried about the symbolic threats of  immigrants – the threat of  religions that
are perceived to emphasise non-Brit ish values and a terminal community other than that of  Britain, and
the threat to shared customs and way of  lif e’. More recent studies paint the same picture: while concerns
over immigration are strongest among groups who f eel both economically and culturally threatened, it is
divisions over culture that are a more important driver – and they are growing.
In f act, UK cit izens are now more likely than their continental neighbours to say that immigration is
negatively af f ecting their national culture. Across f ive European states the average who thought so was
35 per cent. In the UK it was 50 per cent. You have of ten argued that these cultural anxieties are primarily
a knee- jerk reaction to more important economic and class-based issues: a legit imate f ront-stage to
more toxic backstage tensions over which group got what resources, and how much. I contend that this
goes the other way: arguments about jobs and housing are more acceptable to voters than deeper
concerns about whether minorit ies share the same values, norms and ways of  lif e. Across Europe, the
f ar right has been so devastatingly ef f ective not because it has pitched to concerns about resources but
because it has spoken to f ears about a loss of  cultural unity, national identity and ways of  lif e. These
concerns are not rooted in individual experience: they are concerned mainly with the impact of  diversity
on the wider national community. The challenge, then, is to speak to the culturally threatened, and think
f ar more innovatively about how to speak to their value-based rather than resource-based concerns.
Beginning to open up this conversation is paramount. Talking about economics is merely scratching the
surf ace.
Final Words
One response to all of  this is that – ult imately – immigration and identity concerns do not really matter.
These anxieties have never swayed elections, and cit izens who are most concerned about these issues
lack the numerical signif icance to warrant more than token gestures. But this is a dangerously naïve view,
not least because it ignores evidence about the longer-term impact of  these issues: namely that when
public concerns over immigration and cultural unity remain unresolved, overall levels of  public trust in the
polit ical system go down. Research in the U.S. has shown that – as a result of  perceptions of  cultural
dif f erences between groups – cit izens become less f avourable toward using the institutions of  the state
to reduce poverty and provide welf are. This speaks directly to the core centre- lef t agenda. You will be
nervous about the conversations above. But not having them may well undermine your longer-term goals.
The same applies in Britain, where academics such as Lauren McLaren have shown how f eelings of
cultural disunity do not apply only to f eelings toward other cit izens: they also stretch to f eelings about
polit ical elites and how the overall community is governed. Put in other words, by ignoring these concerns
over immigration and identity – and in particular getting to get to grips with the cultural dimension – you
risk undermining not only your own goals, but broader trust in the Brit ish polit ical system.
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